In Siberia, Russia is experiencing the consequences of climate change in heat waves, melting permafrost, wildfires, biodiversity loss, and damage to infrastructure. Impacts associated with global warming are happening four times faster across much of Russia than in other parts of the world. Consequently, Russian domestic policy treats climate change as a challenge to its economic and environmental well-being.
In foreign policy, climate change is a new frontier in Russia’s efforts to protect its national security and advance its geopolitical interests. Russian support for Azerbaijan’s hosting of the twenty-ninth Conference of the Parties (COP29) of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in November 2024 highlights the Kremlin’s ambitions to shape global climate politics. Those ambitions have grown despite the Ukraine war, domestic economic problems associated with Western sanctions, criticisms of Russia’s inadequate mitigation of greenhouse gases, and pursuit of oil and gas cooperation during COP meetings.
Russian climate diplomacy is growing more prominent as U.S. President-elect Donald Trump prepares to withdraw the United States from the Paris Agreement on Climate Change and from efforts to increase climate finance after COP29. What Moscow wants to achieve in climate diplomacy, and how it intends to secure those objectives, makes Russian foreign policy important for collective action on climate change over the next decade.
The Road to Russia’s Climate Strategy
Russian policies on climate change reflect the geopolitical shifts the country faced when the Cold War ended and the changes in the international balance of power over the first two decades of the twenty-first century. Following the Soviet Union’s collapse and during a period of domestic turmoil, a destabilized Russia joined the emerging international climate change regime by signing the UNFCCC in 1992 and the Kyoto Protocol in 1997.
Russian domestic policy treats climate change as a challenge to its economic and environmental well-being
Russia remained engaged with the UNFCCC and adopted its first climate strategy, the Climate Doctrine, in 2009. However, its reemergence as a major power in the 2010s, its adoption of the Paris Agreement in 2016, its vaccine diplomacy during COVID-19, and the war with Ukraine in the early 2020s have transformed Russian policies by making climate change a national security priority.
In 2021, Russian leadership adopted the National Security Strategy that included the idea of ecological security, which covers climate change. That year, Moscow also issued a socioeconomic development plan that aimed to achieve low domestic greenhouse gas emissions by 2050. In 2023, Moscow updated its foreign policy concept and revised the Climate Doctrine in ways that subordinated its evolving climate policies to its national security goals.
Russia’s Positions on Mitigation and Adaptation
President Vladimir Putin clarified what the foreign policy and climate strategies meant for climate mitigation when he stated that, although a transition to carbon neutrality does not damage Russia’s interests, accelerating the shift toward green energy threatens those interests. The Kremlin believes that moving to a green economy creates more competition for resources that could result in underfunding fossil-fuel energy sources and increase the potential for an energy crisis. Tighter climate policies and regulations outside Russia could also hurt oil and gas exports, which produce significant revenue for the public and private sectors.
To adhere to national security considerations, the Russian climate strategy embraces a low-emission, carbon neutrality approach to mitigation and supports adaptation measures as more cost effective given the economy’s dependence on fossil fuels. The Russian Central Bank has warned that without more adaptation actions, one-third of companies in important sectors could face financial decline between 2030 and 2040. Russia bolsters its mitigation and adaptation positions with scientific research to strengthen its voice in climate diplomacy.
As outlined in the climate strategy adopted in 2023, Russia is taking steps to cutting emissions in line with achieving low emissions by 2050. The Climate Doctrine highlights the economic and reputational risks that inadequate mitigation actions can create. Over the past two years, Moscow has developed the infrastructure for a carbon market through regulation and monitoring, the Ministry of Economics playing a leading role in oversight. Important stakeholders include the Central Bank of Russia, the presidential administration, the state-run nuclear corporation Rosatom, and the private sector.
In 2022, Russia launched a national voluntary carbon market, which to date has registered nearly 40 climate projects by private-sector entities that have the potential to produce more than 82 million carbon credits. The Russian Central Bank has developed recommendations and requirements for financial organizations to assess climate risk, stress-test methodologies, issue green bonds, and trade carbon units on the National Trading Exchange.
The carbon-neutrality initiative begun in the Sakhalin region in 2022 aims to achieve carbon neutrality by 2025 and, if successful, would make the region the first in Russia to meet the neutrality goal. As established by federal law, the Sakhalin experiment involves creating a carbon-unit system, testing emission quotas, launching nature-based carbon-capture projects, and tracking carbon absorption by forest and marine ecosystems.
Russia is also implementing mitigation and adaptation actions in the Arctic, where global warming is thawing the permafrost and affecting development of the Northern Sea Route. In Yakutia, for example, public-private infrastructure projects include nature-based adaptation solutions, and Rosatom’s installation of low-power nuclear reactors supports regional energy needs without increasing greenhouse gas emissions. Those adaptation and mitigation measures align with Russia’s goal of modernizing its economy through climate policies.